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private sector investment in the economy 
is lower today than it was in the socialist 
phase of the 1960s.
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As my report ‘Owners of the Republic: An Anatomy of Egypt’s Military Economy’1 details, 
the involvement of the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) in providing public goods and ser-
vices and in generating income has undergone a significant transformation in both scope 
and scale under President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi, in comparison to the era of his predecessor 
Hosni Mubarak.2 While this is partly a predictable outcome of the EAF’s political ascent 
since seizing power in 2013, it is even more a reflection of how Sisi has gone about the 
twin tasks of revitalising the national economy and reinvigorating public finances since he 
assumed the presidency in 2014. The president does not have a clear economic blueprint, 
let alone a sound understanding of market dynamics, but his relentless drive to generate 
capital – while preserving intact the regime maintenance logic that has underpinned suc-
cessive administrations since the establishment of the republic in 1953 – is giving rise to a 
new version of Egyptian state capitalism. 
Egypt has come a long way since then-president Gamal Abdul-Nasser established its 
state capitalist model in the early 1960s, often labelled ‘Arab socialism’. Following on 
the land reform and ‘Egyptianisation’ of the private sector of the 1950s, this state capital-
ism version 1.0 transformed social relations and shifted capital formation decisively into 
state hands. Version 2.0 emerged out of the two main waves of privatisation that took 
place under President Hosni Mubarak between 1991 and 2009, which resulted in a major 
reduction of state ownership of assets and of its share of overall production of goods 
and services. Most salient about this version of Egyptian state capitalism, however, was 
the centrality of political ‘connectedness’ to the profitability of both private and public 
business sector companies, as economists Ishac Diwan, Philip Keefer, and Marc Schiff-
bauer have shown.3 
Sisi is modifying the model yet again, reclaiming the state’s centrality for setting param-
eters for decision-making by all economic actors and bending the private sector to its 
capital investment strategy, even while continuing to profess official commitment to a 
free market economy. Version 2.0 of state capitalism was especially notable for the crony 
partnerships formed between the president and his two sons, core members of the ruling 
National Democratic Party, and connected private sector businessmen. In contrast, the 
administration that took shape after the military takeover of power in July 2013, and espe-
cially after Sisi assumed the presidency in May 2014, has held former Mubarak cronies 
at arm’s length. Nor, notably, has it cultivated new cronies among independent big busi-
nessmen, although a coterie of favoured lesser businessmen is emerging, whose common 
denominator is connections to the presidential office and the military or to their local 
extensions, such as provincial governors. 
However, state capitalism version 3.0 is far from being a simple reversion to the model 
that Nasser built, whether socially or economically. For one thing, Nasser pursued a path 
1   Yezid Sayigh, ‘Owners of the Republic: An Anatomy of Egypt’s Military Economy’, Carnegie Middle East 
Center Report (2019), available at: https://bit.ly/3or9hRO (accessed 6 January 2021).
2   Ibid. 
3   Ishac Diwan, Philip Keefer, and Marc Schiffbauer, ‘Pyramid Capitalism: Cronyism, Regulation, and 
Firm Productivity in Egypt’, The Review of International Organizations 15/1 (2020), pp. 211–46.
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that redistributed wealth and transformed social relations, above all by widening peasant 
ownership of land and by expanding and empowering both the working class and a large 
new middle class through state-funded industrialisation, universal free education and 
healthcare, and employment in a massively increased state bureaucracy. The Sisi era, in 
contrast, is marked by regressive fiscal policies and a resultant sharp widening of income 
disparity, reflected in deepening poverty, contraction of the middle class, and concen-
tration of wealth and privilege in the top social tier.4 Although major public spending lies 
at the heart of state capitalism 3.0 as it did under Nasser, Sisi’s revised version takes real 
estate and construction as its main driver and issuing government bonds as a main source 
of foreign capital, rather than manufacturing and the associated expenditure on industrial 
base and technology acquisition.5 
Rather, the more striking parallels arise between the economic model emerging under 
the Sisi administration and that followed by its closest allies in the Gulf, the United Arab 
Emirates and Saudi Arabia. This is not accidental, as he consciously emulates them. In 
both cases, achieving greater efficiencies within the state sector while promoting revenue 
generation through commercialisation of state-owned assets including land and other 
natural resources (rather than from expanding direct taxation) are major policy com-
ponents. Lacking the kind of oil and gas-based wealth that allows Gulf monarchies to 
sustain rentier economies, Egypt’s state capitalism version 3.0 reinvents parasitic capital 
extraction from the larger economy. Because the state’s tax revenues are declining – due 
to the stagnation of business and contraction of income and disposable capital for most 
Egyptians, even before the COVID-19 pandemic – the extractive mode drives the need for 
yet more extraction. This downward spiral is slowed only by constant infusion of capital 
assistance from foreign partners, and by Sisi’s efforts to streamline extraction from both 
the public and private domestic business sectors.6
As fundamental a difference between Egypt and the GCC economies is the role of the 
military in the transformation of economic and commercial activity under Sisi. By its own 
claim, the military employs five million people, the vast majority in the various public 
works projects it undertakes for the government.7 Virtually all are in fact employed by 
4   The dominance of this feature prompted Heba Khalil and Brian Dill to label this ‘statist neoliberalism’, 
see their ‘Negotiating Statist Neoliberalism: The Political Economy of Post-revolution Egypt’, Review of 
African Political Economy 45/158 (2018), pp. 574–91.
5   Samer Atallah notes that the Egyptian economy remains reliant on rent economic activities. Non-oil 
exports have not expanded beyond traditional markets and still operate within very weak value chains, 
and foreign investment is confined to portfolio investment in government debt instruments. See: 
‘COVID-19 in Egypt: The Return of Harsh Realities’ in Mirette F. Mabrouk (ed.), ‘Rethinking Egypt’s 
Economy’, Middle East Institute Policy Paper (2020), p. 6, available at: https://bit.ly/38oi4yt (accessed 6 
January 2021). Indeed, this is why Sisi’s approach does not, by any means, constitute a revival of the kind 
of state capitalism called for by Linda Matar in ‘Twilight of ‘State Capitalism’ in Formerly ‘Socialist’ Arab 
States’, The Journal of North African Studies 18/3 (2013), pp. 416–30.
6   I owe this and numerous other insights in this paper to Robert Springborg, private correspondence 
dated 19 September 2020.
7   Military spokesperson Colonel Tamer el-Rifa’i, in a television interview with Amr Adib, Al-Hikayah, 2 
September 2019, available at: https://bit.ly/3nxWPyi (accessed 6 January 2021).
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private subcontractors working for the military, and the stated number merits a great deal 
of skepticism (as does the method of calculating it), but it is indicative of the trend. As 
this paper shows, Sisi relies increasingly on the military to spearhead the evolution of state 
capitalism version 3.0. His approach may help generate macro-level economic growth and 
improve the efficiency of public finances in the short term, but its principal outcome is to 
reinforce and perpetuate the grip of the Egyptian state, rather than create and consolidate 
a free market economy, and to deepen Egypt’s shortage of capital.
These trends are demonstrated through the expansion and diversification of military eco-
nomic activity in five sectors that serve the Sisi administration’s evolving version of state 
capitalism: real estate development, creation of industrial and transport hubs, rentier or 
extractive activities related to natural resources, relations with the private sector, and the 
effort to increase the state’s financial efficiency while seeking private investment to help 
capitalise the public sector. The first three sectors reproduce and revise aspects of the 
rentier economy under Mubarak, but the latter two modify and combine them in ways 
that add up to a more substantive shift overall. The following sections discuss the logic 
driving state capitalism 3.0, before turning to illustrate each of these five sectors. The 
paper then reviews the ‘shell game’ financing of state capitalism 3.0 and the centrality of 
the military to the entire model, and concludes by assessing the consequences of Sisi’s 
effort to maintain a rentier political economy with insufficient rent. 
State Capitalism 3.0
If state capitalism is defined as an economic system in which private capitalism is mod-
ified by a varying degree of government ownership and control, then it never went away 
in Egypt. Despite significant degrees of both full and partial privatisation, state-owned 
enterprises continue to undertake significant commercial activity. Although their share 
may be further reduced if the plan for additional (albeit partial) sell-offs that has been 
stalled since 2018 is finally put into action, the reach of Egyptian state capitalism might 
not be seriously diminished. As Khalid Ikram, a former director of the World Bank’s Egypt 
department observed as recently as 2018, government interventions through laws and 
regulations in many economic sectors remain so widespread that they virtually determine 
the level and composition of output, even though these sectors formally are in the hands 
of private decision-makers.8 The ‘footprint’ of the government in the Egyptian economy 
remained much more extensive than might be inferred from traditional criteria, such as 
the ratio of government expenditure to Gross Domestic Product (GDP). An unusually 
frank World Bank report released in December 2020 reaffirmed that ‘the presence of SOEs 
[state-owned enterprises] in almost every sector feeds a perception of widespread activity 
and even overstretch, while the multitude of governing laws and ownership frameworks 
under which they operate makes their identification difficult and complex’.9
8   Khalid Ikram, The Political Economy of Reforms in Egypt: Issues and Policymaking Since 1952 (London: I. 
B. Tauris, 2018), pp. 92–3.
9   ‘Creating Markets in Egypt: Realizing the Full Potential of a Productive Private Sector’, Country Private 
Sector Diagnostic, International Finance Corporation (2020), p. 12, available at: https://bit.ly/3pZ0W8n 
(accessed 6 January 2021).
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The net value of military ownership or control of economic assets and income from the 
sale of goods and services produced or procured by various military agencies is far smaller 
than many portray, though it is now considerably greater than on the eve of Mubarak’s 
ouster a decade ago. What the growth in discretionary funds controlled by the Ministry of 
Defence allows it to do is significant, nonetheless. It allows the military to increase fringe 
benefits and cement loyalty among the rank-and-file, build a war chest from which it can 
bankroll the development of military infrastructure and arms acquisitions (where these 
cannot be funded by foreign assistance), make politically targeted media acquisitions 
and stimulate donations to bodies such as Tahya Misr (Long Live Egypt), Sisi’s pet social 
welfare and development fund.
This does not mean that the elements of Sisi’s approach are bound together within an 
integrated strategy. Rather, what they share is that they are all driven by his determination 
to secure capital, his conviction that bringing the concentrated power of the state to bear 
constitutes the most effective strategy for achieving this, and his use of the military as a 
spearhead. Indeed, given the withering of most sources of capital, the drive to generate it is 
less a choice for Sisi than an absolute necessity if he is to maintain his governing coalition 
of state institutions. The further, critical implication is that Egypt’s state capitalism 3.0 
is locked onto a path of mainstreaming the military’s role in economic management and 
revenue generation, not due to any economic grasp or commercial acumen it may claim, 
but because it is both the most politically dependable and powerful coercive agency of the 
state. Paradoxically, the principal consequence is to reinforce the structural shortcomings 
of the economy and propel a downward spiral.
Reproduction and Revision
Real Estate
A major plank in Sisi’s approach is massive state investment in creating real estate. In 
effect, real estate now fulfils the role of heavy industry in the Nasser era, as a primary 
recipient of public investment and vehicle for generating revenue, driving economic 
growth, and attracting private investors. Much of this effort is managed by the EAF’s Engi-
neering Authority and Mega-Projects Department, in coordination with the New Urban 
Communities Authority (NUCA), which is heavily staffed by EAF retirees. This includes 
construction of three ‘smart’ cities (so-called because they use digital technology to 
improve energy efficiency and provide permanent surveillance for service provision and 
for policing) targeting upper-middle-class customers with luxury housing, facilities and 
beach fronts, mimicking the Dubai model. Other urban projects are intended specifically 
for less wealthy middle-class families, and still others as dormitory cities for workers in 
new industrial zones being established in the Suez Canal zone and at military-managed 
land reclamation sites in Upper Egypt. 
The exact cost of these various urban schemes is unclear, but they account for part of the 
huge tranche of ‘national projects’ that received 4 trillion Egyptian pounds (over $200 
billion) in government funding in the four or five years leading up to November 2019, 
10 Praetorian Spearhead
according to Sisi.10 First phase works for the new administrative capital being built east of 
Cairo had alone absorbed nearly ten percent of total spending (EP300 billion, or $19.05 
billion) by January 2020.11 This military-managed mega-project comes with a projected 
five-year price tag of $58 billion by 2022.12 
The difference in sheer scale of national projects under Sisi and his attachment to gran-
diose ‘edifice’ projects sets him apart from Mubarak.13 That said, official figures show that 
infrastructure did not, in fact, consume the bulk of public investments in 2013–18. As I 
have shown elsewhere,14 total public investments averaged around EP312 billion annually 
in this period, while infrastructure did not exceed a level of EP60 billion annually, suggest-
ing that housing probably accounted for the lion’s share of state-funded national projects.15 
Furthermore, a very large share of spending on housing related specifically to major urban 
construction projects and vanity schemes that embody the drive to create premium-value 
real estate.
Also setting Sisi apart is his attempt to steer real estate from being a speculative free-for-
all by both private actors and corrupt public officials to deal in land released by the state, 
as it was in the Mubarak era. This is not to suggest that crony speculation and profiteering 
by state agencies and officials has ended by any means, but rather to underline the shift 
to a large investment gamble that leaves the state as the principal shareholder. However, 
although anecdotal evidence suggests considerable demand for apartments in the new 
beachfront cities, it is unclear that the state will indeed recoup costs, given that 50–60 
percent of the population is now below or at the poverty threshold, the middle class is 
shrinking, and there are few (if any) foreign or expatriate customers. 
10   Mohamed al-Gali, Samir Hosni, and Mohsen al-Bideiwi, ‘President Sisi: We Have Implemented 
National Projects Worth $200 Billion in 5 Years’, Youm7, 26 November 2019, available at: https://bit.
ly/39am6cP (accessed 6 January 2021). Speaking nearly a year later, Prime Minister Mostafa Madbuly 
confirmed the overall price tag at over EP4 trillion; cited in Hadeel Hilal, ‘Madbuly: National Projects 
Exceeded LE4 Trillion’, al-Shorouk, 11 October 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/3bblkPm (accessed 21 
January 2020). 
11   VL Srinivasan, ‘Egypt’s New Administrative Capital Inching Closer to Reality’, Aggregates Business 
Europe, 12 May 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/2XfVilQ  (accessed 6 January 2021).
12   ‘First Phase of Egypt’s New Administrative Capital Attracts EGP 300bn Investments’, Mubasher, 29 
January 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/2LD4uOp (accessed 9 January 2021).
13   The term ‘edifice complex’ was applied to the case of Egypt by John Waterbury; The Egypt of Nasser 
and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 81.
14   Sayigh, ‘Owners of the Republic’.
15   Figure 9, p. 241. Based on Heba Mahmoud al-Baz, ‘Measuring the Efficiency of Public Spending in 
Egypt and Proposals for Raising It’, National Planning Institute (2014), Table 2, p. 43, https://bit.ly/2Wl-
WuTB (link unavailable). See: State General Budget official website, available at: https://bit.ly/2MQmVxn 
(accessed 1 January 2019). For 2013–14, see: Kamal Amin al-Wassal, The Egyptian Economy Between 
Hammer and Anvil: The Crises of Public Debt and Deficit in the General Budget, the Search for an Exit (Cairo: 
Dar Ibn Rushd, 2015), p. 129. For 2014–15 (US dollar values from source), ‘Egypt Addresses Major Trans-
port Infrastructure Projects’, Oxford Business Group (2016), available at: https://bit.ly/2MU3Lqs (accessed 
7 January 2021). For 2015–16, Mohamed Ali, ‘Egypt Fortifies Itself Through Government Investment to 
Compensate for Private Sector Contraction’, al-Ain al-Akhbariyyah, 16 June 2016, available at: https://bit.
ly/366mXsJ (accessed 7 January 2021). 
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The fact that investments can be made on an unprecedented scale in white elephant and 
prestige projects reflects both the overweening ambition of a president who openly dis-
dains economic feasibility studies and his need to purchase the loyalty of the institutional 
constituencies of the governing coalition he heads.16 Consequently, the military presses 
ahead with schemes such as the new administrative capital, despite not knowing how to 
ensure sufficient water supply for the seven million inhabitants it is designed to host and 
despite upwardly spiralling costs. But there also are striking parallels with the real estate 
bubbles and ‘smart’ cities of Gulf allies. The New Administrative Capital is arguably the 
foremost example of this ‘me-tooism’, although the coastal city of New Mansourah in the 
Nile Delta also mimics Dubai’s artificially created palm frond waterfront.17
Evidently, Egypt lacks the capital that its Gulf counterparts have. But even the progeni-
tors of extravagant investment in new cities – such as the futuristic city of Neom in Saudi 
Arabia – are encountering similar problems, even if they are much richer. Rather than 
change course, however, the response of the Sisi administration has been to double down. 
In September 2020, for example, Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly announced that 20 
new cities along the lines of the new administrative capital were planned, with the aim of 
absorbing population growth.18 This was ironic, since housing costs in these projects are 
well above middle class incomes, and since the nearly 30 new cities constructed by 2017 
accounted for only 3.8 percent of Egypt’s annual population increase, or roughly one-third 
the rate needed to start reversing overcrowding in the Nile valley.19 Doubly ironic is that 
the premium placed on real estate has driven investor speculation, leading to a glut of 12.8 
million apartments under construction or vacant in 2018 according to the estimate of the 
Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics.20
Infrastructure 
The creation of major industrial, transport, and service hubs forms the second pillar of an 
evolving state capitalism in which military agencies are once again the spearhead. These 
concentrate in the Suez Canal zone and along the Red Sea coast, where several clusters of 
industrial zones, associated ports and highways, worker cities and at least one up-market 
‘smart’ city, and chemical industries are being constructed under military management.
16   Sisi comments in a speech to African leaders, posted as ‘Sisi: Feasibility Studies do not Deliver 
Achievements’, Youtube, 9 December 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i4BwVZJASg8 (video 
unavailable). 
17   Details from ‘Everything You Need to Know About the New Mansoura City’, Property Finder, 25 March 
2019, available at: http://bit.ly/2mnw7hW (accessed 6 January 2021), and ‘Twenty Features of New Man-
soura City’, Egypt Today, 12 August 2017, available at: https://bit.ly/3ojKNtA (accessed 7 January 2021). 
18   Hadeel Hilal, ‘Madbouly: 20 New Cities Along Lines of Administrative Capital to Absorb Population 
Increase’, al-Shorouk, 19 September 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/39banur (accessed 6 January 2021). 
19   According to estimates by urban planning consultant David Sims, using figures published by the 
Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics (CAPMAS); cited in Leslie Cohen, ‘The Desert, 
a Resource Curse: Could Land Be Egypt’s Dutch Disease?’, Cairo Review of Global Affairs (Spring 2019).
20   ‘Egyptian Government Works to Address the Housing Deficit’, Oxford Business Group (2018), available 
at: https://bit.ly/3hUILxQ (accessed 6 January 2021). 
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A preeminent military role in this broad region is virtually inevitable: the EAF regards the 
Suez Canal and adjacent Sinai Peninsula as of prime importance for national defence and 
treats both as its exclusive economic preserve. EAF retirees additionally dominate pro-
vincial government and major bodies such as the Suez Canal Authority and its affiliated 
state-owned companies and almost all port authorities. Half of the EP600 billion spent 
by the government on development in Sinai by April 2020 had been administered by mili-
tary agencies.21 The National Service Projects Organization (NSPO), a Ministry of Defence 
affiliate, also owns several production sites in Sinai and in the Red Sea littoral, parts of 
which are officially designated as ‘strategic areas of military importance’. 
Developing these hubs plays to Egypt’s advantages of straddling an important global trade 
route and offering services to shipping transiting through the Suez Canal. Investing heavily 
in basic infrastructure in this zone also makes economic sense by signalling determination 
to attract business. But goals, priorities and pace are all set by state agencies. Civilian min-
isters and senior civil servants moreover take a back seat to the Ministry of Defence and to 
influential EAF retirees who head bodies operating in the region that are nominally under 
government control but in reality work more closely with the military and the president. 
This presents problems. Projects are routinely conceived and implemented on a massive 
scale, when smaller pilot schemes would be better suited to test investor appetite, allow 
flexibility and adaptation, and assess environmental impacts. Huge housing projects 
assume that large numbers of Egyptians will flock to new worker cities and entrepre-
neurial clusters from other parts of Egypt, although few of the 27 so-called ‘desert cities’ 
constructed over the past four decades have met their population targets. Presenting new 
development hubs as a means of tackling unemployment in impoverished areas such as 
Upper Egypt, as Sisi has claimed, overlooks the fact that they can succeed only by drawing 
skilled labour away from those areas, impoverishing them still further. 
These problems stem to a large degree from the lack of feasibility studies and forward eco-
nomic planning, itself partly the result of presidential hubris. The expansion of the Suez 
Canal offers an especially revealing instance of the egregious consequences. Launched 
by Sisi in 2014 and managed by the Ministry of Defence, the project was accompanied 
by confident assertions that it would double earnings from shipping transit fees to $13.5 
billion by 2023. However, this ignored the stagnation of global trade that was already in 
evidence, the decline of oil exports to the West, the upgrading of the Panama Canal, and 
the opening up of the alternative Arctic route due to global warming. 
The scale of real estate and infrastructure projects underlines the importance of state 
control over land and other natural resources such as water in what remains a heavily 
rentier economy. It also helps explain the confidence, if not abandon, with which the 
president and government have launched capital-intensive projects requiring extensive 
access to land. Rent-based activity is far from new, but its intensification under military 
management constitutes a third feature of state capitalist evolution under the Sisi admin-
21   ‘Sisi: Are There Businessmen Ready to Construct Roads and Tunnels in Sinai at a Cost of Billions?’, 
al-Masry al-Youm, 22 April 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/3oq1bsu (accessed 6 January 2021).
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istration. In addition to its overriding say over allocation of land in designated strategic 
zones, the Ministry of Defence has both direct and indirect forms of legal control over 
the use of all state land, estimated in 2006 to encompass 90–95 percent of Egypt’s total 
surface area.22 Both the Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) regard this as 
one of the most important impediments to private sector activity, but the Egyptian author-
ities resist reforming it.23 
The military has other advantages relating to land. Sisi has used the power to designate any 
part of national territory as a strategic zone to place 21 inter-city highways and a two-ki-
lometre strip along either side under military control, granting the Ministry of Defence 
full economic usufruct over them. This enables it to charge tolls, run or award commer-
cial franchises (including for roadside services and advertising), and potentially lay and 
monitor telecommunications networks (including fibre-optic cabling). The ministry had 
already sought, and failed to dominate the latter sector since 2014, when it made a bid to 
form a monopoly infrastructure company jointly with other state institutions, in which it 
would hold a 51 percent share.24 The award of permanent legal control over national roads 
may therefore offer a backdoor to the dominion it seeks. Offences, accidents, or business 
disputes occurring on or relating to these roads moreover come under the exclusive juris-
diction of military courts, as is the case for all military zones and facilities.
Extractive Sectors
The acceleration of land reclamation and agricultural projects owned or run by the mil-
itary since Sisi assumed the presidency highlights how state agencies are driving home 
these advantages over the private sector. The NSPO set up some of its earliest land rec-
lamation in military zones in the south of the country in the 1990s, but it has undertaken 
massive greenhouse cultivation and fish farming projects in more densely populated areas 
since 2014. The NSPO moreover uses military conscripts as labour in what are in effect 
large state-owned farms, in what is supposedly a free-market economy. Sisi gave a sense of 
the scale during his inauguration of a new NSPO greenhouse farm in August 2019, antic-
ipating that military-run food production would provide 10–15 percent of market needs.25 
The Minister of the Public Business Sector, Hisham Tawfiq, appeared to confirm the trend 
to market concentration by complaining, a few months later, that the dairy sector was 
highly fragmented and ‘needs a giant project to avoid any crisis that may occur if individ-
22   ‘Egypt Public Land Management Strategy’, Vol. I: Policy Note, Report No. 36520, World Bank, 15 June 
2006, available at: https://bit.ly/2XlUrQK (accessed 6 January 2021).
23   ‘Arab Republic of Egypt: Fourth Review Under the Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund 
Facility-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for the Arab Republic of 
Egypt’, Middle East and Central Asia Department, International Monetary Fund, 6 April 2019, available at: 
https://bit.ly/38liNjB (accessed 6 January 2021). 
24   ‘Defence Ministry to Gain Ruling Share of Communications Infrastructure’, Daily News Egypt, 15 
October 2014, available at: https://bit.ly/39pO2tt (accessed 6 January 2021). 
25   Mohsen Samikah, ‘Sisi at the Greenhouses Project: “We Will Not Side With Merchants Against the 
People”’, al-Masry al-Youm, 17 August 2019, available at: https://bit.ly/3s5SCoS (accessed 6 January 2021). 
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uals decide to give up raising cows’.26
Egypt is already below the threshold of water poverty and heading toward absolute water 
scarcity by 2025, prompting the government to restrict rice cultivation by civilian farmers 
in the Nile Delta, but the military enjoys unfettered access to water for state-funded proj-
ects and for its own. Along with the new cities being built under military management, 
NSPO projects are fed with water lifted from underground aquifers or transported by 
canal from Lake Nasser or the Nile river. This is a particularly energy-intensive and costly 
process, but the military is able to undertake it without regard to economic feasibility or 
environmental impact. This has enabled agri-businesses established by Gulf investors in 
some land reclamation schemes to receive water below true market cost, allowing them, 
literally, to export water.27 Not only are NSPO fisheries major consumers of fresh water, 
but they have been set up in prime locations: the lagoons of the densely-populated and 
farmed delta and of northern Sinai, and along the new Suez Canal expansion constructed 
under military management in 2014–15. 
The focus on rentier activities has extended under Sisi to military involvement in the 
extraction and marketing of natural resources. Until 2014, military involvement was largely 
indirect and informal. This mostly comprised the bribes and illegal fees demanded by EAF 
retirees (and civilian officials) working in local government departments to issue quarry-
ing and mining licenses to private contractors. Income did not accrue to the Ministry of 
Defence, but in 2015 a government decree required approval for the extraction of mineral 
wealth anywhere in the country and empowered it to levy fees on all output at production 
sites.28 The ministry moreover received exclusive rights to the proceeds of extracting and 
processing raw materials from mines and quarries found on military-controlled land.29
Since then, the NSPO has built marble and granite plants with a production capacity 
greater than the country’s entire current output, putting it in a potentially monopolistic 
position.30 In 2016 it acquired a majority stake in the public company that controls Egypt’s 
sole black sands site, which produces heavy metals such as titanium and zirconium with 
an expected export value of $176 million annually.31 It also acquired a stake in gold pros-
26   Ahmed Ashour, ‘Government Teams with Sovereign Fund to Counter Dominance of Small Cow 
Owners’, al-Mal, 17 November 2019, available at: https://bit.ly/38non5f (accessed 6 January 2021). 
27   Nada Arafat and Saker El Nour, ‘How Egypt’s Water Feeds the Gulf ’, Mada Masr, 15 May 2019, available 
at: https://bit.ly/2MCRWal (accessed 6 January 2021). 
28   Decree of Head of Council of Ministers 1657 of 2015, Manshurat Qanuniah, available at: https://bit.
ly/398rvB7 (accessed 6 January 2021). 
29   Publication of Implementing Statutes of Law on Mineral Wealth, Manshurat Qanuniah, available at: 
https://bit.ly/38k8lZQ (accessed 6 January 2021). 
30   Ayat Al Tawy, ‘Sisi Inaugurates Mega Industrial Complex in Upper Egypt’s Beni Suef ’, al-Ahram, 15 
August 2018, available at: https://bit.ly/3nosB0G (accessed 6 January 2021). This centred on a new indus-
trial site at Bani Suef that commenced activity in 2018, but in late 2019 the NSPO announced that it was 
developing six additional plants in southern Sinai and the Suez Canal zone, according to NSPO Director 
Major General Mostafa Amin, cited in Mahmoud Mostafa and Mai Midhat, ‘Head of NSPO: World Com-
panies Race to Import Granite from Egypt’, Masrawy, 5 November 2019, available at: https://bit.ly/35hbIio 
(accessed 6 January 2021). 
31   Official company website, available at: http://www.nspo.com.eg/nspo/ebsc/ar/products.html (link no 
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pecting, which alone accounts for 1 percent of GDP, and expanded its role in producing 
and marketing phosphates and fertilisers.32 The overwhelming majority of extraction sites 
are in military-controlled zones, through which the military both spearheads the expan-
sion of the state’s stake in these sectors and injects itself into external trade. 
Subordinating the Private Sector 
The military’s expansion in at least some of these extractive industries poses a direct 
challenge to private companies. This reflects the fourth feature of the evolving nature of 
state capitalism under the Sisi administration, namely its reorientation and realignment 
of relations with the private sector. Although the latter accounts for 70–75 percent of GDP 
and of jobs, the state remains very much in the driving seat in setting economic goals and 
priorities, and is the sole investor in public infrastructure. With public spending estimated 
at 31 percent of GDP in 2016, the state is also the source of a large share of the private 
sector’s turnover, especially for large and medium enterprises.33 For Amr Adly, this is the 
institutional explanation for the lack of private sector market integration and underdevel-
opment that, in Egypt, gives rise to what he calls ‘cleft capitalism’.34
The massive surge in public spending on housing and infrastructure since late 2013 has 
probably increased the share of business that private companies derive from the state, 
since they undertake the actual work. This has also amplified the centrality of politi-
cal connections and nepotism in securing public contracts, especially for the military, 
which has the legal power to award contracts for projects it manages by ‘direct order’, or 
non-competitive bidding. Military agencies have leveraged the ability to grant or withhold 
contracts in order to extract greater than normal profit margins while compelling private 
companies to accept significantly smaller ones, or none at all, in the public works proj-
ects it manages. The latter represented approximately one-quarter of the total in 2014–18, 
indicating a significant transfer of private capital – in the form of denied profits or of 
compulsory absorption of state costs – in order to underwrite government schemes and 
benefit military-held funds. 
Sisi has repeatedly portrayed state investment in infrastructure as a benefit to private com-
panies, which are relieved of sinking their money into establishing industrial parks and the 
like. But private companies have shown relatively limited appetite to locate businesses in 
longer available, last accessed 14 October 2020). On expected export value, see: Mohamed Soleiman, 
‘Start of Setting up Black Sands Projects with an Investment of One Million [Egyptian] Pounds’, Youm7, 
4 January 2017, available at: https://bit.ly/35iDGu7 (accessed 6 January 2021). 
32   Ra’fat Ibrahim, ‘Shalatin Mineral Wealth [Company]: 13 Gold Mines Start Experimental Production in 
2017’, Youm7, 22 October 2016, available at: https://bit.ly/2LbLyqj (accessed 6 January 2021). 
33   Public spending figure from George Abed, Chun Jin, and Boban Markovic, ‘Egypt: Good Progress to 
Date, but Sustainability Requires Deep, Transformational Change’, Institute of International Finance, 20 
February 2019, p. 4, available at: https://bit.ly/35jKZ4O (accessed 6 January 2021). 
34   Amr Adly, Cleft Capitalism: The Social Origins of Failed Market Making in Egypt (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2020).
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the zones most favoured with state funding. This appears to be both consequence and 
cause of the preference of the president and the military to privilege foreign investors in 
the Suez Canal economic zone, in part because they can leverage international credit and 
technology. The continuing ambiguity of the legal and regulatory frameworks governing 
investment in ventures established jointly with military agencies or in strategic zones con-
trolled by the Ministry of Defence acts as an additional deterrent for domestic companies 
from investing there. 
The complete exemption of the military from the jurisdiction of civilian courts means 
that business disputes involving it cannot be taken to arbitration. Poor enforcement of 
contract and concerns over the military’s tax advantages also discourage foreign compa-
nies from investing in Egypt.35 But companies from countries whose governments have 
good political relations with the Sisi administration – such as China, Russia, and Italy – are 
likely to perceive a lower risk. And even when larger, well-connected Egyptian private 
companies are eager to partner on military-supported projects, it can still take them years 
to win approval, as was the case for the investment by Carbon Holdings in the massive 
Tahrir Petrochemicals Complex on the Gulf of Suez. This makes military agencies what 
Diwan, Keefer, and Schiffbauer dub ‘a large crony market leader’, at least in relation to 
projects for which they manage the award of contracts. Their research shows that public 
business sector and private companies that are politically connected receive bigger slices 
of the subcontracting market, with the balance made up by a much larger number of less 
productive small companies using vintage technologies and serving local market niches.36
The fact that the administration has allowed six years to pass since it launched its 
mega-projects without providing a suitable legal framework confirms both the power of 
military interests and Sisi’s general view of economic development as first and foremost 
a state-led affair. In theory, state investment could provide venture capital to open up 
and develop new economic sectors, absorbing risk and then handing over to private com-
panies. This was certainly the rationale Sisi offered in April 2020 for military-managed 
mega-projects in areas such as the East Port Said development zone.37 But he did more to 
set the tone by berating the private sector at the same time for failing to invest in Sinai, 
blithely overlooking the obstacles to its involvement.38 He similarly skirted the obvious 
question of why private companies would invest in projects designed without consultation 
with them and lacking feasibility studies, arguing that ‘the return on basic infrastructure 
projects is national security … a price tag cannot be set on [this]’39. Clearly, Egypt diverges 
35   ‘Special Report: From War Room to Boardroom. Military Firms Flourish in Sisi’s Egypt’, Reuters, 16 
May 2018, available at: https://reut.rs/38lixkS (accessed 6 January 2021). 
36   Diwan, Keefer, and Schiffbauer, ‘Pyramid Capitalism’, p. 232.
37   Mohamed al-Gali, Samir Hosni, and Mohsen al-Bideiwi, ‘President Sisi: We Have Implemented 
National Projects Worth $200 Billion in 5 Years’, Youm7, 26 November 2019, available at: https://bit.
ly/2L2Y2kc (accessed 6 January 2021). 
38   ‘Sisi: Are There Businessmen Ready to Construct Roads and Tunnels in Sinai at a Cost of Billions?’, 
al-Masry al-Youm, 22 April 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/3otDSy4 (accessed 6 January 2021). 
39   Nour Rashwan, ‘President Sisi: We Have Spent 600 Billion [Egyptian] Pounds to Develop Sinai, National 
Security Does Not Have a Price Tag’, al-Shorouk, 22 April 2020, available at: https://www.shorouknews.
com/news/view.aspx?cdate=22042020&id=f0cec522-5e07-40ee-b6ef-ca8df4458ed3 (accessed 6 January 
2021). 
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sharply from, say, the East Asian model of state or state-sponsored capitalism, in which 
governments stimulated impressive private sector growth by leading investment in spe-
cific economic activities, creating industrial development funds, and providing other 
positive encouragements, especially making land available to private business. 
Far from opening up new ground, military companies have expanded aggressively into 
tradable commodity sectors dominated by the private sector. The military had previously 
avoided these sectors, but at Sisi’s urging it has taken over ailing private companies or 
established new ones in the production of cement, steel, phosphates and fertilizers – all 
of which enjoy heavy trade protection. These markets were already over-supplied, and so 
military entry has inflicted severe losses on private producers who have had to reduce util-
isation of existing capacity and stockpile unused materials and output. Previously, private 
companies benefited from joining public counterparts in protected sectors. But the entry 
of military companies into the same sectors under terms that allow it to set market price 
– that is, as both buyer and seller – transform the picture. 
The shift of market share to military companies raises the costs of participation for private 
companies, who then burden the government with demands for compensatory subsidies. 
By September 2020, non-military cement manufacturers were suffering a 40 percent glut 
in capacity.40 The drop in market demand was worsened by the COVID-19 pandemic, 
but the steep decline had already started in 2018, when the massive new military cement 
factory at Bani Suef came online.41 Public sector companies have also been among the 
hardest hit. The Iron and Steel company, for example, had debts and arrears amounting 
to EP9.1 billion and losses of EP783.8 million by March 2020 (for a 410 percent ratio of 
losses to capital).42 
The above-mentioned acquisition of Egyptian Steel reveals another facet of state capi-
talism 3.0, namely the readiness of the military or other politically-connected agencies 
to exploit the financial travails – caused or at least exacerbated by their own interven-
tions – of private companies in order to take over their market share or acquire them. In 
public, the military has justified its investment decisions in terms of breaking (non-exis-
tent) monopolies and stabilising supply and prices.43 But a more obvious factor is that the 
military feels that it can behave in this manner because military-managed public works 
and the military’s own enterprises offer it an assured market for its output. The Ministry 
40   Percentage given by Sinai Cement company board member Tamer Magdy, cited in al-Morsi Izzat, 
‘Sinai Cement Beseeches Government to Save Industry from Collapse’, al-Mal, 6 September 2020, avail-
able at: https://bit.ly/3hQdsEj (accessed 6 January 2021). 
41   For more on military expansion into the cement and steel sectors and the impacts on civilian manu-
facturers and markets see: Sayigh, ‘Owners of the Republic’, pp. 212–16.
42   The company’s problems were aggravated by the failure of the Egyptian Steel company, which was 
acquired by the NSPO in 2018, to honour a pledge to buy 230,000 tons of scrap iron from Iron and Steel. 
Confirmed in ‘Iron and Steel, All Possibilities Are Open’, Hapi Journal, 23 August 2020, available at: 
https://bit.ly/3bi6ma9 (accessed 6 January 2021). 
43   For example, the statement by the head of the EAF Engineering Authority Major General Kamel 
al-Wazir, cited in Hani Abdelrahman, ‘Kamel al-Wazir: The President Instructed Us to Build a Steel 
Factory to Prevent a Monopoly’, al-Masry al-Youm, 9 April 2016, available at: https://bit.ly/2MIUW5f 
(accessed 6 January 2021). 
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of Military Production has applied a similar logic since 2013, using its newfound political 
influence to poach public procurement contracts from other government ministries that 
would normally have gone to civilian competitors (both private and public), thus assuring 
a captive market for its mostly loss-making companies.44
The powerful political position of the military – and of key security agencies such as the 
General Intelligence Directorate, which is extensively staffed by EAF officers – and the 
tentacular spread of senior EAF retirees throughout the state apparatus – adding a further 
layer of bureaucratic power – greatly enhances its leverage.45 This was translated into the 
purchase (often under duress) of a swathe of private media and broadcasting companies 
since 2014, and extends to the extortion of board membership or equity from private 
entrepreneurs in return for issuing the necessary paperwork allowing them to register 
start-ups. It also allowed the NSPO in 2017 to elbow private businesses aside to take its 
marble and granite production capacity to 80 percent of Egypt’s total, and then launch a 
phosphate and fertilizer factory complex in 2019 with a production capacity greater than 
the entirety of Egypt’s total output.46
Predatory behaviour is both justified and enabled by Sisi’s prioritising income-genera-
tion at apparently any cost. The president has fuelled the trend by legally empowering a 
growing list of military (and security) agencies to form their own commercial ventures. 
In December 2015, he moreover issued a decree authorising any government entity to 
establish public limited companies after obtaining cabinet approval, paving the way for 
expanded encroachment by both civilian and military agencies on the private sector’s 
share of various markets.47 The government went a step further in September 2020, when 
it reversed a 50-year contract previously given to private sector company KATO Invest-
ment in 1999 to construct and operate Alamein International Airport, in order to re-assign 
it instead to the Ministry of Defence.48
44   The ministry’s poaching strategy is examined in detail in: Sayigh, ‘Owners of the Republic’, pp. 56–8.
45   For a detailed analysis of their spread, see Yezid Sayigh, ‘Above the State: The Officers’ Republic in 
Egypt’, Carnegie Middle East Center Paper (2012), available at: https://bit.ly/3bkaAhQ (accessed 6 January 
2021). 
46   Jamal Boukhari, ‘Des Conscrits au Service du Complexe Militaro-industriel en Égypte’, Orient XXI, 
28 August 2017, available at: https://bit.ly/2XnIidK (accessed 6 January 2021). On phosphate and fer-
tilizer factory, ‘Sisi Inaugurates Largest Fertilizers Complex in Middle East at Ain al-Sukhna’, al-Masry 
al-Youm, 7 August 2019, available at: https://bit.ly/3nkjtKB (accessed 6 January 2021). On total national 
production: Sanaa Allam, ‘Chemical Exports Council: $4 Billion Worth of Exports Target for Sector by 
the End of This Year, Expect Number of Exporting Companies to Reach 1,000 by 2018’, Amwal al-Ghad, 
9 December 2017, available at: https://bit.ly/2XjKGlR (accessed 6 January 2021). 
47   For Law 127 of 2015, see: https://manshurat.org/node/14296 (accessed 8 January 2021).
48   On the original build-operate-transfer (BOT) contract: Amirah Ibrahim, ‘Return to Al-Alamein’, 
al-Ahram Weekly, 2 June 2005, available at: https://bit.ly/2Lxt43k (accessed 8 January 2021). On the 
government decision to transfer the contract, see: Mohamed Napoleon, ‘Council of Ministers Agrees 
to Award Contract to Build and Operate Alamein International Airport to Ministry of Defence’, 
al-Shorouk, 24 September 2020, available at: https://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?c-
date=24092020&id=b3c41394-edb3-4e0c-bffe-e625f0a2de5f (accessed 8 January 2021). The decision 
may reflect internecine rivalry with KATO Investment chairman Ibrahim Kamel, who is a Mubarak-era 
crony businessman; ‘Court Unfreezes Assets of Mubarak Regime Strongman’, Ahram Online, 6 January 
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The Sisi administration seeks private sector investment, but exclusively on its own terms. 
It perceives generating income and providing commodities at affordable prices for select 
constituencies to be of overriding importance politically, and regards disruption to rela-
tions with the business community as a tolerable consequence. State control of land, 
external trade, and natural resources is clearly leveraged to maximise these ends. Sisi’s 
political priorities underlie his endorsement of the dumping by the Ministry of Defence 
and NSPO of large amounts of cheap imported chicken and meat in domestic markets 
to benefit low-income groups, undercutting and damaging local private producers. Sim-
ilarly, in 2018 the NSPO joined three other state-owned companies in forming a joint 
venture aiming to be the ‘exclusive commercial agent of all phosphate producers in Egypt’, 
although twelve major private companies already serve the sector.49 The following year, 
Sisi placed land surrounding the major tourist destination of Hurghada and 47 Red Sea 
islands used by private tour operators under military control.50 The minister of tourism 
later hinted at the justification, accusing private tourist companies of ‘not contributing a 
single [Egyptian] pound to support tourism’.51
Sugar-coating State Capitalism
These various developments embody the distinctive fifth feature of the version of state 
capitalism evolving under Sisi: the striving to streamline public spending and increase the 
state’s financial efficiency, while shifting part of the burden of state-led, capital-intensive 
activities onto private investors. In effect, Sisi seeks to trim and reallocate rents, utilising 
the military to spearhead and secure the process.
The Egyptian government has considerably reduced spending on energy and food subsi-
dies since Sisi assumed the presidency, and brought the public sector wage bill down from 
its historic rate of 7–8 percent of GDP to 5 percent. The ratio of non-performing loans in 
the banking sector has been brought down to its lowest levels since the record high of 
2005, a significant part of which is borne by state-owned banks that, by investing in other 
public entities, effectively buy their debt.52 And in September 2020, Sisi ratified Law 185 
of 2020 (amending Law 203 of 1991 that established the public business sector), stipulat-
ing that state-owned companies incurring losses exceeding half their capital should be 
liquidated and allowing public sector companies to be placed under private management 
2013, available at: https://bit.ly/2MNixBR (accessed 8 January 2021). 
49   Company Overview, Egyptian Marketing Company For Phosphate and Fertilizers, available at: https://
bit.ly/2XlOV0a (accessed 8 January 2021). 
50   ‘Presidental Resolution Allocating 47 Islands of State Land to the Armed Forces’, Official Gazette, 
4 August 2019, reposted in Masrawy, 7 August 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/3hVMuLh (accessed 8 
January 2021). 
51   Yasmine Fawaz, ‘Minister of Antiquities to Parliament: The Private Sector Does Not Spend a Pound 
to Support Tourism’, al-Mal, 7 June 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/3ot6hEx (accessed 8 January 2021). 
52   ‘Egypt Non Performing Loans Ratio, 2011-2020, Quarterly’, CEIC, available at: https://bit.ly/3oysNvS 
(accessed 8 January 2021). 
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(while remaining in state ownership).53 This is in addition to a planned overhaul of 127 
companies in the public sector that are officially reported as collectively over EP45 billion 
in debt (although state-owned textiles companies incurred approximately EP49 billion in 
losses and debts alone), and to bring younger blood into company management.54
Restructuring the remaining public business sector is a bold step, since it represents a 
further weakening of the core social constituency on which every presidential adminis-
tration since Nasser has based itself and sought to appease. This followed two years of 
failed attempts by the government to privatise its loss-making businesses, which met 
considerable resistance from both managers and workers. In late 2020, the new law 
prompted an attempted flight of state-owned companies seeking to leave the Public 
Enterprise Ministry in order to find shelter from the new measures by seeking to be 
placed under other ministries.55
Sisi has been more circumspect in tackling another important pillar of his public sector 
constituency and a major vested institutional interest, namely the discretionary ‘special 
funds’ held by many government ministries and agencies. Known more commonly by the 
unflattering label of ‘black boxes’ and numbering 6,061 in 2013, they were estimated a year 
later to hold $9.4 billion in deposits, which do not appear in the general budget.56 On Sisi’s 
order, the state treasury has charged a 10 percent annual levy on the special funds since 
2014, raised to 25 percent in 2016, but their de facto status as ‘no more than companies 
belonging to the [state] entity that owns the funds’ has not changed.57 Apparently the 
53   The original Law 203 of 1991 exempted public sector enterprises (including military companies) 
from standard government procurement and contract procedures, and placed them on par with private 
sector firms in relation to salaries, benefits, pensions, bonuses, and so on. On Sisi’s decree ratifying Law 
185 of 2020, see: Mohamed al-Gali, ‘Sisi Ratifies Amendment of Public Business Sector Companies Law’, 
Youm7, 13 September 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/35qf0zU (accessed 8 January 2021).
54   Abdel-Halim Salem, ‘Public Sector Changes its Skin, Young Faces to Take Over Leadership of 60 Com-
panies Within 3 Months’, Youm7, 20 September 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/2MLPjmR (accessed 8 
January 2021). Losses and debts of textile companies according to NSPO director-general Major General 
Mostafa Amin, cited in ‘National Services Projects Authority: Textiles Industry Capable of Achieving 
Significant Growth’, al-Shorouk, 28 July 2020, available at: https://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.
aspx?cdate=28072020&id=cf206222-b7a1-4a50-9dcd-ea113f03b003 (accessed 8 January 2021). 
55   For example, Abdel-Azim al-Qadi, ‘Nasr Fertilizers Calls for Transferring Chemical Industries Compa-
nies to Ministry of Petroleum’, al-Ommal, 9 October 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/3pYmZfl (accessed 
8 January 2021) and Shaimaa Hafthi, ‘Misr Hotels Calls for Extraordinary General Assembly to Exit 
Public Enterprise Ministry’s Jurisdiction’, Masrawy, 8 October 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/3q6R1h3 
(accessed 8 January 2021).
56   Figure of $9.4 billion given in Nizar Manek and Jeremy Hodge, ‘An Interview on Egypt’s Slush Funds’, 
Sada, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 9 July 2015, available at: https://carnegieendowment.
org/sada/60660; and in Nizar Manek and Jeremy Hodge, ‘Opening the Black Box of Egypt’s Slush Funds’, 
Africa Confidential, 26 May 2015 (link unavailable); and Eman el-Sherbiny, ‘Uncovering Egypt’s Slush 
Funds’, Business Today Egypt, August 2015, available at: https://bit.ly/3hUxn4V (accessed 8 January 2021). 
57   Decree cited in ‘El-Sisi Appropriates 10% of ‘Special Funds’ Annual Revenues to 2014/15 Budget’, 
Ahram Online, 14 July 2014, available at: https://bit.ly/35mTufs (accessed 8 January 2021). Quotation 
from Major General Safwat al-Nahhas, member of a recently formed administrative reform committee, 
cited in Amira Mamdouh, ‘Administrative Reform Committee Rejects the Permanent Employment of 
Special Funds’ Contractors’, Dostor, 3 May 2017, retrieved from Akhbarak, available at: https://bit.ly/39e-
Obje (accessed 8 January 2021).  
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president feels unable to dismantle the funds altogether and recover their deposits fully, 
highlighted by the exemption of the military’s special funds from the levy. Instead, he has 
directed government ministries to ‘become self-sufficient… and not become overdrawn 
on the state treasury’.58
These various measures have been insufficient to increase state revenue or generate capital 
on the scale the president seeks, however, compelling the government to borrow heavily. 
As a result, the public debt-to-GDP ratio reached an elevated 90.3 percent by June 2019, 
while foreign debt rose to $112.7 billion by December.59 The scale of borrowing is itself a 
reflection of the overweening power of the state, which means that the Sisi administration 
can incur sovereign debt at virtually any level it wishes in pursuit of its ever-widening array 
of ‘national projects’.60
The resort to borrowing reflects the failure of Sisi’s parallel striving to attract private sector 
funding for state-led projects and, when this fails, to allow the military and select state 
institutions to take market share away from it (as shown in the previous section). Sisi’s 
approach paid off initially. Domestic bank depositors invested EP32 billion in response 
to Sisi’s call for the Suez Canal expansion he launched in 2014 to be funded entirely by 
Egyptian resources.61 However, the government was able to repay the investment certifi-
cates on time in 2019 largely thanks to the 50 percent devaluation of the Egyptian pound 
in the meantime – indicating a roughly 50 percent ‘haircut’ in the dollar value returned 
to depositors. There have been no similar attempts since to finance public infrastructure 
exclusively with private capital. 
The construction of an entirely new administrative capital demonstrates this. Announc-
ing the project in 2015, the prime minister boasted it would not cost the Egyptian state ‘a 
single millim’, as it would be financed by commercial funding in partnership with private 
companies and foreign investors.62 The Administrative Capital for Urban Development 
58   According to the Minister of Transport Lieutenant-General Kamel al-Wazir. Ironically, for his ministry 
this has meant raising ticket prices for the modes of transport used almost exclusively by low-income 
Egyptians. Cited in Hosam Emad, ‘Kamel al-Wazir: [Transport] Ministry’s Budget Deficit Stands at LE6 
Billion, We Have Presidential Directive to Become Self-sufficient’, al-Shorouk, 29 June 2020, available at: 
https://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=29062020&id=87b0c5fc-cc47-45a2-a77c-51d4e-
aef2c3b (accessed 8 January 2021).
59   Public debt ratio according to the World Bank, available at: https://bit.ly/3hY2wEK (accessed 8 January 
2021). Amount of foreign debt from Sayyed Badr, ‘Foreign Debt Owed by Egypt Rises to $112.7 Billion by 
End of 2019’, al-Mal, 3 May 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/38qCiYk (accessed 8 January 2021). 
60   Finance Minister Mohamed Maait confirmed this with his boast, in August 2020, that after borrow-
ing for the preceding fifteen years to pay for food and drink, the purpose of borrowing since 2017 has 
been to fund national projects – see: Maged Tamraz, ‘Finance Minister: Egypt Spent 15 Years Taking 
Out Loans to Pay for Food Imports, but Now Egypt Takes Out Loans for National Projects’, Youm7, 29 
August 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/2L4dhJF (accessed 8 January 2021). 
61   According to FEB President Hisham Ezz El Arab, cited in Abdel-Razeq Al-Shuweikhi, ‘Banks Spent EP 
1bn for Social Development Over Past 3 Years: FEB Chairman’, Daily News Egypt, 23 September 2014, 
available at: https://bit.ly/2MKGPMO (accessed 8 January 2021). 
62   Ayman Hamzah, ‘Housing Minister: The New Administrative Capital Will Not Cost the State a Single 
Millim’, al-Masry al-Youm, 29 September 2014, available at: https://bit.ly/35m1Zah (accessed 8 January 
2021). 
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Company (ACUD), which manages the project and is owned jointly by the Ministry of 
Defence, NSPO, and NUCA, has maintained the fiction by claiming that it is funding 
construction with revenue from the sale or leasing of state land – which is, of course, 
a nationally-owned resource. In reality, borrowing is an important source of funds (as 
with the canal expansion), but this is increasingly at risk. Concerns about project viability 
prompted major Emirati firms to pull out, suspension of a $3 billion Chinese loan over 
concerns about repayment, and the failure of talks over a $20 billion Chinese investment.63 
By May 2019, at most 20 percent of investment had come from abroad.64 
A proposal touted by Sisi since August 2018 to float military companies on Egypt’s stock 
exchange offers further insight to his approach to financing. He has presented this as a 
magnanimous opportunity for private sectors to acquire shares in successful public enter-
prises, but in reality it constitutes an effort to offset the cost of subsidising them while 
enabling them to expand further into civilian sectors.65 For once, government ministers 
were visibly reluctant to embrace the idea, and Sisi finally shelved it, possibly because 
flotation would require financial disclosure and posed the potential risk of losing control 
of military companies to private shareholders.66 
Instead, the Sovereign Fund of Egypt (Tharaa) has emerged as the president’s preferred 
vehicle to bring private investment into public entities and projects, while leaving the 
state – or, more accurately, the president – in control.67 Law 177 of 2018 establishing the 
fund awarded the president the power to transfer ownership of unused state assets to it, 
while shielding his decisions from judicial appeal.68 Parliament subsequently approved an 
amendment to the law in July 2020 additionally including ‘utilised’ state assets within the 
president’s gift.69 
63   Emirati pull-out noted in Mirette Magdy, ‘Emaar’s Talks With Egypt Over New Capital City Project 
Stall’, Bloomberg, 30 December 2018, available at: https://bloom.bg/2XoqW0E (accessed 8 January 2021). 
Suspension of Chinese loan noted in Eric Knecht, ‘Egypt’s Capital Project Hits Latest Snag as Chinese 
Pull Out’, Reuters, 8 February 2017, available at: https://reut.rs/2XmgtTd (accessed 8 January 2021). On 
Chinese investment, Mirette Magdy, ‘China’s $20 Billion New Egypt Capital Project Talks Fall Through’, 
Bloomberg, 17 December 2018, available at: https://bloom.bg/3oxNEzq (accessed 8 January 2021). 
64   Aidan Lewis and Mohamed Abdellah, ‘Egypt’s New Desert Capital Faces Delays as it Battles for Funds’, 
Reuters, 13 May 2019, available at: https://reut.rs/3s6g1qn (accessed 8 January 2021). Anecdotal evidence 
shows that the military and the president’s entourage have alternatively coaxed and coerced some of 
the country’s best known private real estate developers into investing in the new capital, in the hope 
of projecting confidence and drumming up buyers to shore up funding for future phases of state-led 
construction.
65   Yezid Sayigh, ‘Will Egypt’s Military Companies Float?,’ Carnegie Middle East Centre Article, 7 April 2020, 
available at: https://bit.ly/39hFkxj (accessed 8 January 2021). 
66   For example, Minister of Public Enterprise Sector Hisham Tawfik was careful, if not downright evasive, 
when asked about Sisi’s proposal on national television; interview by Lamis al-Hadidi, 4 November 
2019, al-Qahirah al ‘An, available at: https://bit.ly/3hSPng5 (accessed 8 January 2021).
67   Patrick Werr, ‘Egypt’s New Sovereign Fund Cherry-picks Assets to Lure Investors – CEO’, Reuters, 11 
December 2019, available at: https://reut.rs/3nrJvLG (accessed 8 January 2021). 
68   ‘We Publish the Full Text of the Law Establishing the Egypt Fund After Parliament Approved It’, 
Youm7, 16 July 2018, available at: https://bit.ly/2Lyl4PL (accessed 8 January 2021). 
69   Safa Isam-al-Din, Ismail al-Ashwal, and Ahmed Oweiss, ‘Parliament Approves Egypt Sovereign 
Fund’, al-Shorouk, 20 July 2020, available at: https://www.shorouknews.com/mobile/news/view.aspx?c-
date=20072020&id=3d607cc1-346a-4b3b-9881-350b294b18fe (accessed 8 January 2021). 
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This highlights the contrast with sovereign wealth funds in other countries that have large 
domestic savings and current account surpluses – both of which Egypt lacks. Unlike its 
peers, Tharaa relies in effect on rebranding under-utilised capacity or resources and inef-
ficient companies. It is supposed to play the role of ‘an accelerator’ for placing select 
state assets under partial private control, according to Minister of Planning and Economic 
Development Hala El-Saeed.70 But in the view of one market analyst this makes it ‘a sov-
ereign holding company’ rather than a sovereign wealth fund.71 
A second important feature setting Tharaa apart from many of its peers is that it offers 
Sisi a means to avoid the rules and regulations that pertain to public funds. This moreover 
extends to oversight. The role of the state’s Central Accounting Agency, whose powers 
and independence have been steadily eroded by Sisi since 2015, is reduced from reviewing 
and auditing – assessing financial soundness and spending integrity – to merely submit-
ting overall financial statements and activity reports to the president and parliament.72 
Nor is it apparent that Tharaa submits to review by the Administrative Monitoring Author-
ity, headed and overwhelmingly staffed by active duty and retired EAF officers, which is 
now Egypt’s most powerful audit agency.73
In this respect Tharaa is a scaled-up version of the Tahya Misr (‘Long Live Egypt’) fund 
that Sisi established in 2014. With a remit to support social and economic development 
among the urban and rural poor, Tahya Misr is financed through donations from the 
public, private businesses, and state agencies, and lies outside the state budget. A legal 
amendment issued in July 2020 stipulated that ‘the president of the republic will decree 
the method of supervising, managing and administering financial and administrative 
affairs of [Tahya Misr], in accordance with the nature and activity of the fund to enable 
it to carry out its mission without restriction by the governmental regulations referenced 
in any other law’.74 Crucially, while this model has been used elsewhere – Tunisia’s Fonds 
de Solidarité Nationale established by former president Zine al-Abdine Ben-Ali comes to 
mind – it is now being applied in effect to Tharaa as well.
The military is once again spearheading Sisi’s approach to financial and asset manage-
ment. In April 2015, then Prime Minister Ibrahim Mahlab appointed the head of the 
Financial Authority of the Ministry of Defence as treasurer of Tahya Misr and an EAF 
brigadier general as its financial director.75 Not surprisingly, the president’s financial affairs 
70   Marc Champion, ‘New IMF Program Still Up in the Air as Egypt Primes Its Economy’, Bloomberg, 21 
January 2020, available at: https://bloom.bg/3bkAoKD (accessed 8 January 2021). 
71   Mark Townsend, ‘Egypt Plans Sovereign Wealth Fund—Of A Kind’, Global Finance, 1 May 2018, avail-
able at: https://bit.ly/3q2YMEu (accessed 8 January 2021). 
72   The role of the Central Accounting Agency was described by Rami Galal, an advisor to the minister of 
planning in ‘What Are the Mechanisms for Auditing the Sovereign Wealth Fund? Advisor to Planning Min-
ister Responds’, Cairo24, 6 September 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/3bjHrTF (accessed 8 January 2021).
73   For discussion of the Authority’s role, Jessica Noll, ‘Fighting Corruption or Protecting the Regime? 
Egypt’s Administrative Control Authority’, Project on Middle East Democracy, 6 February 2019, available 
at: https://bit.ly/3nrQ3tZ (accessed 8 January 2021); Sayigh, ‘Owners of the Republic’, pp. 310–11.
74   Beesan Kassab, ‘Tahya Masr: How Sisi Bypassed Auditing a Multi-billion Pound Fund’, Mada Masr, 6 
April 2016, https://bit.ly/3s2CvJ3 (accessed 8 January 2021). 
75   Hind Mokhtar, ‘Mehleb Appoints Major General Mohamed Nasr as Treasurer of the Long Live Egypt 
Fund’, Youm7, 17 April 2015, available at: https://bit.ly/35pKTIH (accessed 8 January 2021). 
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advisor is an EAF major general too.76 The overlaying of military and administrative roles 
is leading to further synergies. In February 2020, the company managing the new adminis-
trative capital, ACUD, revealed that it will transfer ownership of assets worth EP50 billion 
to Tharaa.77 This assures its military stakeholders future dividends from real estate sales 
and leases. ACUD was additionally granted ownership of the buildings in central Cairo 
that will be vacated by government ministries moving to the new capital, granting it more 
real estate in a prime location.78 In the same month, Tharaa also agreed to include ten 
NSPO companies in a portfolio of assets for promotion and investment, and in December 
announced that two were ready for public offer.79
Egypt’s sovereign fund is emerging as a device to solicit private investors with the assur-
ance of profits, in ways that maintain both state control over the assets and the opacity 
of their true finances. As if to further underline ambiguity about sources of funding and 
how it is spent, private businessmen have come under sustained pressure to donate to 
Tahya Misr, a practice that has spread far beyond large firms to include smaller businesses, 
such as hotels in popular tourist destinations, which reportedly are expected to make 
monthly donations.80 Indeed, the very fact that Sisi went out of his way to reassure leading 
businessmen in December 2015 that failure to donate to Tahya Misr would not lead to 
nationalisation or confiscation of their businesses spoke volumes about the nature of the 
relationship – as much as it did about his administration’s need for private capital and 
how little of it has been forthcoming.81
A Familiar Shell Game
In September 2020, the Egyptian government approved establishment of a new agency 
under the Ministry of Finance that would have the legal remit to manage assets and funds 
reclaimed by the state and to invest them outside the general budget, with profits accruing 
to the state treasury.82 These include assets and funds that are recovered from cases of 
embezzlement, placed under government receivership, nationalised, or merely under-uti-
lised. While increasing the efficiency of state resources makes obvious sense, it is typical 
76   See: ‘السيسي يوجه باستمرار تطوير أنشطة صندوق تحيا مصر في مختلف المجاالت االجتماعية والخدمية’, al-Shorouk, 6 October 
2020, available at: https://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=06102020&id=97c06502-
4297-4e8a-b8c0-f0f3d3a6bd14 (accessed 9 January 2021). 
77   Afaf Ammar, ‘Ahmed Abdin: Administrative Capital [Company] Contributes Around 50 Billion [Egyp-
tian] Pounds to Sovereign Fund’, al-Shorouk, 9 February 2020, available at: https://www.shorouknews.
com/news/view.aspx?cdate=09022020&id=d1f595b7-1770-45d5-8be0-6374eee7b6d3 (accessed 8 January 
2021). 
78   Ruth Michaelson, ‘“Cairo has started to become ugly”: Why Egypt is Building a New Capital City’, The 
Guardian, 8 May 2018, available at: https://bit.ly/2XmicYC (accessed 8 January 2021). 
79   Mirette Magdy, ‘Egypt to Put Army Firms on Offer, Dangling Full Ownership’, Bloomberg, 10 December 
2020, available at: https://bloom.bg/3otF3xA (accessed 8 January 2021). 
80   Various anonymised interviews.
81   Amira Gad, ed., ‘Six Letters of Reassurance From Sisi to Businessmen, Most Importantly Reforming 
Fiscal Policy’, Tahrir News, 3 December 2015, available at: https://bit.ly/3pUwfRE (accessed 8 January 
2021). 
82   Hind Mokhtar, ‘Cabinet Approves Establishment of ‘Agency for Managing and Disposing of Reclaimed 
Funds’’, Youm7, 3 September 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/3q32FJA (accessed 8 January 2021).
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of Sisi’s administration that various ministries and agencies will bandwagon to undertake 
similar activities regardless of whether or not they are the best equipped to do so. In this 
case, the Ministry of Finance will duplicate to at least some degree what Tharaa was estab-
lished to do. 
More importantly, these investment vehicles so far add little to economic value by provid-
ing venture capital for the private sector to transform manufacturing, integrate technology, 
or upgrade services and increase commodity exports. Instead, they appear distinctly 
speculative. In effect, Sisi’s version of state capitalism is a variation on a familiar shell 
game: it transfers capital from the private sector and to the state, and from both to institu-
tions he establishes or favours – most prominently the Tahya Misr fund, Tharaa, and the 
military. His approach offers higher efficiency, but remains crucially reliant on borrow-
ing and politically-motivated foreign assistance to make up for fundamental economic 
shortcomings that his approach fails to address, let alone resolve: low productivity and 
declining investment, mounting public and foreign debt, and above all, a chronic shortage 
of domestically-generated revenue and capital. 
After seven years of high-profile public spending on housing and infrastructure and on 
massive edifice projects such as the Suez Canal expansion and the new administrative 
capital, the Sisi administration has been unable to attract more than what the World Bank 
calls ‘sluggish’ foreign direct investment. Not only is most of this directed at one sector, 
energy, but it has moreover declined sharply since 2017.83 Egypt’s other productive sectors 
are left struggling with diminishing levels of private investment, domestic as well as 
foreign. In light of the inability to generate surplus capital from these sectors, the focus on 
real estate investment becomes all the more apparent as an especially large Ponzi scheme, 
or what Diwan, Keefer, and Schiffbauer label ‘pyramid capitalism’.
Nor has company performance – both private and public – shown signs of sustained 
improvement despite Egypt having had one of the highest nontariff barrier frequencies in 
the world until at least 2010.84 Indeed, campaigns launched by Sisi and echoed incessantly 
by government and military business leaders to ‘buy Egyptian’ and ‘resettle’ or ‘localise’ 
(tawteen) technology and manufacturing know-how in Egypt reveal the continued failings 
of a political economy model that successive administrations have remained adamantly 
resistant to restructuring. Touted as a means of reducing imports, achieving foreign cur-
rency savings, and increasing local content and economic value added, indigenisation has 
addressed none of the shortcomings that doomed Nasser-era efforts at import substitut-
ing strategies, and remains a mere slogan. Underscoring this, joint ventures assign much 
(if not all) of the actual manufacture or construction of technology-intensive projects to 
foreign partners, with Egyptian public companies doing little more than securing neces-
sary bureaucratic permits, providing state land as equity, and assembling equipment or 
vehicles using kits supplied from abroad. 
Reflecting these hard realities, Egypt ranked 140th worldwide in the economic globali-
sation index for 2017, having declined from a maximum (since 1970) of 62.93 points in 
83   Mostafa Eid, ‘Why Has Foreign Direct Investment Declined to its Lowest Level in 5 Years?’, Masrawy, 
6 October 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/35pAAo9 (accessed 8 January 2021).
84   Diwan, Keefer, and Schiffbauer, ‘Pyramid Capitalism’. 
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2007 to 45.63 points, compared to a world average for 188 countries of 59.06 points in the 
same year.85 Three years later, the COVID-19 pandemic placed its political economy model 
under even greater pressure. In some respects, its trade and industrial protectionism does 
not differ from the worldwide trend, but it is far from harnessing the automation, online 
activity, advanced intellectual property generation, and data repository building that will 
determine which economies will bounce back in the post-pandemic global economy.86 
An especially significant indicator in this context is that Egypt’s capital investment (pur-
chases of new plant and equipment by firms leading to greater future production) stood 
at only 16.66 percent of GDP in 2018, compared to a world average based on 157 countries 
of 24.54 percent.87
New Management
The military is central to state capitalism 3.0, and to the consolidation of the political 
and social trends that are associated with it. Researchers stretching from Anouar Abdel-
Malek to Zeinab Abul-Magd have highlighted its role in Egyptian state and society since 
the 1950s, but the fusion of its bureaucratic, economic, and ideological power and narrow-
ing of its social base are peculiar to state capitalism 3.0.88 Presidential control over the EAF 
in the Nasser era was successfully contested by Defence Minister Abdul-Hakim Amer, 
Nasser’s successor Anwar Sadat engineered a more balanced relationship, while Mubarak 
secured EAF loyalty and political acquiescence by allowing it to acquire economic and 
bureaucratic sinecures that I have labelled elsewhere as the ‘Officers’ Republic’.89 Under 
Sisi, in contrast, the military is emerging as his full partner in remodelling the rentier state, 
reshaping its political, bureaucratic, and economic management. For Heba Khalil and 
Brian Dill, the military underpins ‘a seemingly conflicting model of statist neoliberalism, 
which partially seeks neoliberal reforms, while reinforcing the state’s centralised control 
over the economy’.90
EAF officers, whether in service or retired, both spearhead Sisi’s energetic drive to extend 
the state’s reach into all spheres and ride on its coattails. No central or local govern-
ment initiative to reclaim land, expand agriculture, build new cities, or extend associated 
infrastructure now takes place without some measure of formal consultation with mil-
itary agencies, even if they are not directly responsible for implementation. At the very 
85   For various value points: https://bit.ly/3pYJbpB and for global rankings: https://bit.ly/38ryaqI (accessed 
9 January 2021).
86   This assessment of the determinants of divergence in world economies comes from: ‘The Pandemic 
has Caused the World’s Economies to Diverge’, The Economist, 8 October 2020, available at: https://
econ.st/38pM1On (accessed 6 January 2021). Application to Egypt is mine.
87   See: https://bit.ly/2JZaP6A (accessed 8 January 2021).
88   Anouar Abdel-Malek, Egypt: Société Militaire (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1962); and Zeinab Abul-Magd, 
Militarizing the Nation: The Army, Business, and Revolution in Egypt (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2018).
89   Sayigh, ‘Above the State’. 
90   Khalil and Dill, ‘Negotiating Statist Neoliberalism’, p. 588.
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least, permission to use state land for any of these purposes requires the approval of both 
the Ministry of Defence and of the National Center for Planning State Land Uses, whose 
head is almost always a retired EAF officer. Many of the governors and senior ministry- or 
provincial-level officials involved in approving projects, awarding contracts, and issuing 
permits are also EAF retirees. Military approval has also become mandatory since 2014 in 
other areas, such as the extraction of mineral wealth from quarries and mines anywhere 
in the country.
At least as significant is the military’s role in the attempt to revive and reconfigure an 
import substituting industrial strategy. This is most graphically reflected, in the first 
instance, in a governmental requirement issued in June 2020 that all state bodies seeking 
to import goods or services from abroad must obtain approval from the National Author-
ity for Industrial Development or the Ministry of Military Production.91 The latter ministry 
moreover heads the Committee on Digital Production and is a member of the Digital 
Transformation Coalition, positioning it to influence any future investment of political or 
financial capital in joining the so-called Industrial Revolution 4.0 in manufacturing and 
related industries and value creation.92 
In the second instance, military agencies are investing major efforts in the revival or 
construction of state-owned factories, most prominently in the textile sector, which is 
estimated to account for 17 percent of GDP and to employ 1.2 million93 (this is besides mil-
itary-owned factories in the cement, steel, and fertiliser sectors, where they have acquired 
shares of up to one-quarter of national production capacity). The NSPO is a lead partner 
in the development of what is proudly billed as the ‘largest cotton spinning company in 
the world’, itself located in a major new hub built by the EAF Engineering Authority at 
Roubiki, near Cairo.94 Seeking to revive yet another Nasser-era industrial giant, various 
government ministries and military agencies have concluded a slew of agreements with 
foreign companies and governments to establish manufacturing ventures in the automo-
tive sector in Egypt, encompassing electric cars and buses, train engines and carriages, 
and industrial and agricultural vehicles. Military representatives now routinely attend 
meetings between government ministers to discuss plans for localising the automotive 
91   Iman Ali, ‘Government Plan to Raise Spending Efficiency and Increase Revenue Collection by 10 
Points’, Youm7, 27 June 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/2LsS5N8 (accessed 6 January 2021).
92   Ahmed al-Lahouni, ‘Achievements and Efforts of the Ministry of Military Production in Support of the 
State’, al-Mal, 25 June 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/3nogAs1 (accessed 6 January 2021). 
93   Percentage of GDP cited in ‘Armed Forces Engineering Authority: Robiky [Industrial Complex] is a 
New Hub for Textile, Weaving Industry in Egypt on a 430 Feddan Area’, Masrawy, 28 July 2020, available 
at: https://bit.ly/3q0iGQz (accessed 6 January 2021). Employment figure given by NSPO director-general 
Major General Mostafa Amin, cited in ‘National Services Projects Authority: Textiles Industry Capable 
of Achieving Significant Growth’, al-Shorouk, 28 July 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/3nrJA2e (accessed 
6 January 2021).
94   ‘NSPO: Spinning and Weaving Industry Capable of Attaining Sustained Growth’, al-Shorouk, 28 July 
2020, available at: https://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=28072020&id=cf206222-b7a1-
4a50-9dcd-ea113f03b003; and ‘Public Enterprise Minister: Inaugurating Largest Textile Factory in the 
World in Egypt in September 2021’, Youm7, 28 July 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/38tbRRQ (accessed 
8 January 2021). 
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industry and overhauling the cotton and textiles sector, bringing them closer to setting 
industrial policy and goals.95
The fact that there is next to none of the research and development (R&D) base needed to 
attain meaningful technology transfer – nor a private sector positioned to feed and expand 
associated spin-off activities – indicates strongly that such efforts replicate the focus on 
capital-intensive projects, without tackling the long-term fundamental problems con-
fronting the economy. George Abed, a former director of the Middle East and Central Asia 
Department at the IMF, noted in 2019 for example, that Egypt spends only 0.6 percent 
of GDP on R&D compared to 4.3 percent in South Korea and Israel, 2.2 percent in Singa-
pore, 2 percent in China, and 1.3 percent in Malaysia and Brazil.96 (Tellingly, there are few 
instances of Egyptian defence production today that do not rely on Nasser-era technology 
and processes.)97
Repeated investment in massive new factories and industrial zones feeds into the nation-
alist public discourse that the Sisi administration and military promote actively, but 
obscures the obstacles that continue to impede Egypt’s integration into the global man-
ufacturing value chain. Furthermore, the model of state-led and military aggrandisement 
diverges sharply from the conclusion drawn in a World Bank study that larger firms are 
more effective in advancing development objectives in low- and middle-income coun-
tries as ‘they are more likely to innovate, export, and offer training and are more likely to 
adopt international standards of quality, among other contributions’ – not least because 
in Egypt’s case these do not open ‘markets to greater competition … breaking oligopolies, 
removing unnecessary restrictions to international trade and investment, and establishing 
strong rules to prevent the abuse of market power’, let alone ensuring that ‘private actors 
have the skills, technology, intelligence, infrastructure, and finance they need to create 
large ventures’.98 Although transforming the textile sector from its previous focus on pro-
duction of high-quality raw material requires building a capital-intensive industry and 
makes economic sense, this is delivered by an administration and its military partner that 
focus on output and delivery, with resulting ‘surges of output that don’t match what the 
market needs or can absorb’.99
95   For example, a meeting involving the prime minister, ministers of public enterprise and of trade and 
industry, and the NSPO director-general reported by the Spokesman of the Egyptian President, 25 July 
2020, available at: https://bit.ly/39fwhNi (accessed 8 January 2021). 
96   George Abed, Chun Jin, and Boban Markovic, ‘Egypt: Good Progress to Date, but Sustainability 
Requires Deep, Transformational Change’, Institute of International Finance Report, 20 February 2019, p. 
8, available at: https://bit.ly/3s4FnVz (accessed 8 January 2021). 
97   See, for example, this assessment in ‘Budget and Economy’, Egypt Country Profile, Tawazun: Index of 
Arab Civil-Military Relations, available at: https://bit.ly/38sfvLO (accessed 8 January 2021). 
98   Andrea Ciani, Marie Caitriona Hyland, Nona Karalashvili, Jennifer L. Keller, Alexandros Ragoussis, 
and Trang Thu Tran, ‘Making It Big : ‘Why Developing Countries Need More Large Firms’, World Bank 
(2020), available at: https://bit.ly/3hTKymN (accessed 8 January 2021). License: CC BY 3.0 IGO. 
99   For a useful analysis of the challenges of the Egyptian textile industry, see: Amirah El-Haddad, ‘Picking 
Winners: Identifying Leading Sectors for Egypt and Tunisia Using the Product Space Methodology’, 
Review of Middle East Economics and Finance 16/1 (2020), available at: https://bit.ly/39tOpDl (accessed 8 
January 2021). Quotation is from an anonymised interview with a joint venture business adviser working 
in Egypt until 2019.
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Conclusion: Perpetuating Rentierism Without Rent
That Egypt faces enormous challenges is indisputable. Important policy shifts and massive 
public investment in a range of sectors since Sisi came to power have contributed to mac-
roeconomic stabilisation, and underpin the projection by the IMF in October 2020 that 
Egypt will weather the COVID-19 pandemic with a growth rate above zero in 2021, one of 
only a few Middle East and North African economies to do so.100 None of this would have 
been possible without the influx of Gulf assistance worth some $23 billion in 2013–15, the 
$12 billion IMF Extended Fund Facility programme of 2016–19, and a further IMF emer-
gency loan and Stand-By Arrangement totalling $8 billion in 2020. But instead of seizing 
the opportunity to implement deeper reforms that favour openness in markets and in 
politics and thereby reduce the country’s continuing vulnerability to external shocks and 
high dependence on politically motivated injections of capital, the Sisi administration has 
raised the stakes by investing even more deeply in state capitalism 3.0.
Ironically, through their financial subventions and political support, foreign donors and 
international financial institutions are enabling Sisi to avoid tackling the fundamental 
contradictions undermining his efforts to revise and streamline Egypt’s rentier state. 
Especially telling of this collective failure is the lack of a domestic private sector supply 
response, whether to opportunities created by government initiatives and foreign capital 
flows or to challenges such as the COVID-19 pandemic.101 After nearly seven years of Sisi’s 
economic management, private investment is at 6 percent of GDP, even lower than during 
Nasser’s supposedly socialist era.102
But this is not merely a policy failure, whether foreign or Egyptian. Rather, at the heart of 
state capitalism 3.0 is a strategic shift in the nature of the social and institutional alliances 
that it both serves and rests on. As Steven Heydemann argues, the Sisi administration is 
one of the further advanced among its regional peers in consolidating what he describes 
as a ‘repressive-exclusionary social pact’.103 ‘As a result’, he continues, ‘the chief beneficia-
ries of earlier strategies of contained populist inclusion and mobilisation, social groups 
which had achieved a measure of economic and social mobility via their ties to the state 
bureaucracy, public sector industries, and ruling parties, [have] found themselves newly 
exposed to the volatility of the market, increasingly insecure, and increasingly marginal to 
ruling elites’.104
100   ‘World Economic Outlook, October 2020: A Long and Difficult Ascent’, International Monetary Fund 
Report (2020); see table A4, titled ‘Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Real GDP’, p. 146, avail-
able at: https://bit.ly/3otJ7hk (accessed 8 January 2021). 
101   The lack of a private sector supply response is discussed at length in Ishac Diwan, Nadim Houry and 
Yezid Sayigh, ‘Egypt After the Coronavirus: Back to Square One’, Arab Reform Initiative Research Paper 
August 2020, available at: https://bit.ly/35kaVgu (accessed 6 January 2021).
102   Ibid, p. 11.
103   Steven Heydemann, ‘Rethinking Social Contracts in the MENA Region: Economic Governance, Con-
tingent Citizenship, and State-society Relations After the Arab Uprisings’, World Development, Vol. 135, 
November 2020, p. 3, available at: https://bit.ly/2LaE72F (accessed 6 January 2021). 
104   Ibid, p. 6.
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Far from restoring the old social contract that Nasser-era nostalgists impute to him, Sisi 
is in fact imposing economic precarity on the middle classes as a means of extracting the 
financial means to preserve a much narrower ruling order. This is reflected in the rise of 
the poverty ratio of those living on less than $5.50 a day, from 61.9 percent in 2015 to 70.4 
percent in 2017 (compared to a world average based on 65 countries of 20.04 percent).105 
Given that 32.5 percent of Egyptians lived below the poverty line of $1.50 a day by mid-
2019 (with 6.2 percent in extreme poverty), the growth of an impoverished middle class 
under Sisi has been especially notable.106
The problems and shortcomings facing Egypt are familiar, and yet their harnessing with 
a level of despotic power exceeding that of any previous presidential administration sets 
state capitalism 3.0 of the Sisi era apart.107 There is some potential for Egypt to move 
gradually, fitfully, and even inadvertently towards a situation in which maintaining a 
state-controlled economy becomes untenable. But for now, nothing that Sisi has done 
alters what the IMF 2019 report on Egypt described as ‘long-standing problems of weak 
governance, rent seeking, vulnerabilities to corruption, and the heavy presence of the state 
in the economy’. Egypt now ranks 143th on governance, falling 25 places over the past 
decade, with executive constraints declining from 125th to 160th, rule of law from 68th to 
100th, and government integrity from 78th to 116th in the same period.108
In 1967, a disastrous war with Israel both weakened Nasser and allowed him to contain the 
military, but Sisi’s 1967 moment is more likely to follow a social and economic blowout 
as the effects of the COVID pandemic transform global business models and trade over 
the medium- and long-term. Without a fundamental break in the structuring of economic 
access and opportunity in Egypt, Sisi and any successors in the presidency will remain 
perpetually vulnerable to the contradictions of his rentier state and to the competitive 
rent-seeking of the very state agencies his power depends on.
105   See: https://bit.ly/2Lw7RXq (accessed 22 September 2020). 
106  For poverty rates figures in 2019, according to the chairperson of the Central Agency for Public 
Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), see: Khairat Barakat, ‘32.5 Percent of Egyptians are Living Below 
the Poverty Line: CAPMAS’, Ahram Online, 30 July 2019, available at: https://bit.ly/38llzFJ (accessed 6 
January 2021).
107   I am grateful for the reminder of Michael Mann’s reference to ‘despotic power’ in Toby Dodge, 
‘Gramsci Goes to Baghdad; Understanding the Iraqi State Beyond Collapse, Failure or Hybridity’, Draft 
Paper, LSE Middle East Centre Workshop (Online), 3 October 2020. 
108   ‘Economic Openness, Egypt Case Study, 2020’, Governance Chapter Draft v1.2, Legatum Institute, 
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